This was the most comprehensive and detailed early documentary on Vietnam and is still one of the best. Being released in 1983, it has the enormous advantage of fresh perspectives from all participants, just a short 8 years after the fall of Saigon and 10 years after the signing of the tenuous, short-lived peace agreement, and the return of the POW's. Given that the conflict is almost a half century behind us now, it's beginning to take on the characterization and status of actual history, as opposed to recent events, which is why the timing of this series is so valuable.
Also, no doc that endeavors to tell 'the whole story' about such a controversial and polarizing series of events will escape criticism about bias or a failure to properly drill down on, or even mention specific events or aspects of the conflict. Regardless, these criticisms often boil down to personal opinions, beliefs and experiences, so the creators are forced into the impossible position of simply doing their best to keep their lens as wide as possible and address the results in as unbiased a manner as possible. While I do not profess to be an expert on the subject of Vietnam, it seems to me that the producers managed to present the events in as fair and balanced a manner as possible. This must have been especially difficult, given the fact that, in 1983, harsh memories and stark opinions about the war were still very fresh. Apparently, while the series was reviewed mostly favorably by the media, there was some significant right wing criticism and claims of manipulation or distortion of facts, none of which should be surprising.
While we're naturally preoccupied with our nation's involvement in the conflict, It's both fascinating and important that the series initially dealt extensively with the history of Vietnam up to 1954, just prior to our inheriting of the war from the French. The evolution of two separate eras of French colonization, capitulation and withdrawal in Vietnam, is reviewed in depth, from the late 1800's through early 1954, when they suffered their final decisive defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.
The rise and history of Ho Chi Minh, the most seminal figure in all of Vietnam's 20th century history is given much needed coverage. The figure most reviled by the west in this conflict, the writers do an excellent job of shining light on Ho's history, including his time in America, his move to Paris in 1917 to become a Communist, his founding of the Viet Minh in 1941 to combat both French and Japanese occupation, his alliance with the US against the Japanese during World War II, while it was still in both their interests, his declaration of independence after WWII, coupled with his refusal to accept French recolonization, and his dogged pursuit of a unified Vietnam under a Communist government right up until his death in 1969. In short, it's too bad the guy was a Communist, because it would have been good to have him on our side.
One of the most shameful aspects of the war involved the fact that USA involvement and actions were, at at least in part, promulgated, not simply by foreign policy needs and beliefs, but also the political realities and concerns of, at least two elections in 1964 and 68. The Democrats, in control of the White House since 1960, lived in constant fear of being perceived as soft on Communism as they faced strong opposition and criticism from the likes of Barry Goldwater and Richard Nixon. Many believed that, had he lived to be re-elected in 64, JFK, with the political concerns of his last election behind him, would have extricated the US from Vietnam, because both he and his Attorney General/brother foresaw the futility of the conflict, having visited Vietnam themselves back in the 50's. Only those close to JFK can attest to what his real intentions were, but, when faced with all the practical realities and concerns after the 64 election, who can really say if he would have followed through on an actual withdrawal? While JFK was clearly bold and seemingly unafraid of opposition, pulling out at that time would have certainly have been an especially gutsy move for any President, regardless of his political status. The reasons for this are numerous.
Vietnam had not yet morphed into the horror it would become, and was still, in the fall of 63 seen domestically as little more than a nagging, but important foreign policy headache. We had not yet suffered the shame and humiliation of our multiple failures to gain final decisive victory against an elusive and underestimated enemy whose military capability was erroneously considered vastly inferior to our own. US pride, our can-do attitude, (as well as overconfidence and arrogance), carrying over from WWII prevailed, as the concept of being unable to decisively defeat virtually any enemy combatant was anathema and inconceivable to our collective consciousness. The "domino theory", which advanced the idea that, after one small Southeast Asian nation falls to Communism, they will all fall like dominoes, was the prevailing belief of our government, dating back, at least to President Eisenhower. And there was political enormous pressure, from the right in particular, to contain Communist hegemony at all costs. In short, we, as a nation, had not learned our lesson yet.
So, given that we had yet to experience the real and lasting trauma that the war would eventually inflict, the idea that, in 1963 that we could or should pull out of a conflict at an early stage because "we did not think we could win" would have been inconceivable as a nation and would have angered, not only the political right, but a substantial number of moderates throughout the nation, raised, incorrectly as it turned out, to believe in American political and military infallibility.
20/20 hindsight tells us obviously that, in the end, it didn't really matter much that we lost Vietnam to Communism, that the domino theory was wrong or at least irrelevant, and that we should have gotten out before things got out of control. But, back in 63, things were not that clear, and our beliefs and understandings of ours and our enemies' capabilities, and their intentions were often distorted, exaggerated, or outright wrong. Can you imagine the firestorm of criticism being leveled against a Democratic President, or really any President at that point in time if, after not even receiving any significant defeats as yet, we simply abandoned the conflict? The calls of "defeatism", "cutting and running", "losing Vietnam", being "soft on Communism", "losing our first war", etc. Would have been deafening, and probably from both sides. It is also hard to judge what such an action would have meant to our international prestige. Would all nations, not just the Soviet Union have seen us in a weaker and less respectful light? The conflict was after all, at least publicly supposed to be about the support of our South Vietnamese ally. How would the abandonment of that ally, especially at such an early stage have looked on the world stage? And what ramifications would that have caused for us?
It's entirely possible that JFK, as occurred with Johnson would have found himself in an impossible position and been forced to keep propping up that ally with more troops (or military advisors in JFK's case) and money so we could not be accused of such an abandonment while the Viet Cong continued ramping up their own efforts. So, when viewed strictly in the context of the time, the reasons that Vietnam, not only became, but persisted as a quagmire become discernable and even somewhat understandable.
If JFK really did intend to curtail our involvement after the election, and his foresight into our future with Vietnam was the basis of that intention, then his prescience was indeed remarkable, and I for one would love a peek at that alternate reality, had he lived. But, in his last interview with Walter Cronkite shortly before his death, Kennedy actually expressed ambivalence by claiming at various times that, on the one hand, Vietnam was "their war" and their responsibility, but then shortly thereafter remark that he "did not agree with those who say we should withdraw". So, who is to say that his intentions for Vietnam were in fact clear or that he had made up his mind? Perhaps that ambivalence would have been revealed after the election after all and - despite the fact that he had no more of his own elections to worry about - when faced with all the afore-mentioned concerns, with the countries' international reputation, the future of an ally and the political future of his party at stake, who is to say that he would not have bent to those pressures and ramped up the war as LBJ did? (The only key difference between the two of them in that situation involved the fact that LBJ did have one more of his own elections to worry about).
That interview can serve as a prescient metaphor for all that conflicted beliefs would come over the next 12 years.
One of the strangest paradoxes of the war was the ill fated involvement of the French. After escaping their own occupation by Germany in WWII, the French hypocritically decided to reassert their own colonial aspirations and recolonize Vietnam. From 1946 until 1954, the fought their own futile war against the.
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